Aristotle on the Apparent Good

出版者:OUP Oxford

作者:Jessica Moss

页数:272

出版时间:2012-7

价格:GBP 35.00

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9780199656349

图书标签:亚里士多德心灵哲学亚里士多德哲学20152014

Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us--a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? Why does pleasure in particular tend to appear good, as Aristotle holds? And how do appearances of goodness motivate desire and action? No sustained study of Aristotle has addressed these questions, or even recognized them as worth asking. Jessica Moss argues that the notion of the apparent good is crucial to understanding both Aristotle's psychological theory and his ethics, and the relation between them. Beginning from the parallels Aristotle draws between appearances of things as good and ordinary perceptual appearances such as those involved in optical illusion, Moss argues that on Aristotle's view things appear good to us, just as things appear round or small, in virtue of a psychological capacity responsible for quasi-perceptual phenomena like dreams and visualization: phantasia ('imagination'). Once we realize that the appearances of goodness which play so major a role in Aristotle's ethics are literal quasi-perceptual appearances, Moss suggests we can use his detailed accounts of phantasia and its relation to perception and thought to gain new insight into some of the most debated areas of Aristotle's philosophy: his accounts of emotions, akrasia, ethical habituation, character, deliberation, and desire. In Aristotle on the Apparent Good, Moss presents a new--and controversial--interpretation of Aristotle's moral psychology: one which greatly restricts the role of reason in ethical matters, and gives an absolutely central role to pleasure.

用户评价

图书馆瞄了一眼带回来读，讲stoics中的亚里士多德，pleasure→phantasia→appearance of goodness→representation/desire(goal)，想从心理跨越到道德，感觉做irrationality的可以走这个justify自己

图书馆瞄了一眼带回来读，讲stoics中的亚里士多德，pleasure→phantasia→appearance of goodness→representation/desire(goal)，想从心理跨越到道德，感觉做irrationality的可以走这个justify自己

图书馆瞄了一眼带回来读，讲stoics中的亚里士多德，pleasure→phantasia→appearance of goodness→representation/desire(goal)，想从心理跨越到道德，感觉做irrationality的可以走这个justify自己

图书馆瞄了一眼带回来读，讲stoics中的亚里士多德，pleasure→phantasia→appearance of goodness→representation/desire(goal)，想从心理跨越到道德，感觉做irrationality的可以走这个justify自己

图书馆瞄了一眼带回来读，讲stoics中的亚里士多德，pleasure→phantasia→appearance of goodness→representation/desire(goal)，想从心理跨越到道德，感觉做irrationality的可以走这个justify自己