Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书著者简介

Christopher Adolph is Associate Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Associate Professor of Statistics at the University of Washington, Seattle, where he is also a core faculty member of the Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences. He is a former Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy Research and won the American Political Science Association's Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in political economy. He is the author of "Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality," and his research on comparative political economy and quantitative methods has appeared in American Political Science Review, Political Analysis, Social Science & Medicine, and other academic journals.

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发表于2024-06-17

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Christopher Adolph

出品人:

页数:390

译者:

出版时间:2013-4-15

价格:GBP 72.00

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9781107032613

丛书系列:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

图书标签: 比较政治比较政治经济学政治学政治经济学待获取 Politics

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书图书描述

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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