This book examines the motives of Russia and the former Soviet Union toward most of the Arab states in the Middle East. The author argues that Russia has been an important actor in the region for over a century and has tried to regain its influence in several countries following its strategic retreat after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. However, according to the author, Moscow does not seek confrontation with the United States or with the West in general in the region. Rather, the Russians simply aim to maintain the existing status quo in the Middle East, sometimes acting as a junior partner and other times as a competitor. Washington can better engage Moscow as a stabilising force in the Middle East and as a collaborator in the struggle against Islamist terrorists. At the same time, the United States must understand where Washington and Moscow diverge. Although Russia may be too weak now to compete with the United States on a global scale, it is not happy to see American or EU encroachment into its own neighbourhood. If the West takes their weakness for granted and become blind to the possibilities for Russian alliances in the region, it does so at its peril. This book demonstrates Russia's enduring interest and influence in the Arab Middle East.