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发表于2024-12-31

Dictators and their Secret Police 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Sheena Chestnut Greitens

出品人:

页数:288

译者:

出版时间:2016-7-20

价格:USD 34.99

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9781316505311

丛书系列:

图书标签: 政治学比较政治威权主义比较威权历史 politics 秘密警察社会运动

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How do dictators stay in power? When, and how, do they use repression to do so? Dictators and their Secret Police explores the role of the coercive apparatus under authoritarian rule in Asia - how these secret organizations originated, how they operated, and how their violence affected ordinary citizens. Greitens argues that autocrats face a coercive dilemma: whether to create internal security forces designed to manage popular mobilization, or defend against potential coup. Violence against civilians, she suggests, is a byproduct of their attempt to resolve this dilemma. Drawing on a wealth of new historical evidence, this book challenges conventional wisdom on dictatorship: what autocrats are threatened by, how they respond, and how this affects the lives and security of the millions under their rule. It offers an unprecedented view into the use of surveillance, coercion, and violence, and sheds new light on the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power.

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在组建强制机关时，为什么不同的威权领导人会采取不同的制度设计？不同的制度安排给强制机关的暴力使用造成了怎样的后果？作者认为，面临各种潜在威胁的领导人必须进行组织上的权衡，根据上台之际感知的首要威胁来设计强制机关。如果首要威胁被认定来自精英政变，强制机关的组织特性将更为分裂且脱离社会群体；倘若首要威胁被认为源于民众叛乱，强制机关在组织上将更加统一且渗入社会群体。由于情报能力和激励机制的差异，防政变的强制机关在组建后会卷入更广泛且高强度的暴力活动，而防民乱的强制机关只需采取小范围且低强度的暴力行为。

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马克。独裁者根据精英和民众威胁大小和priority不同来设计相应的coercive apparatus，若前者威胁大则采用fragmented的coercive apparatus，后者则采用更inclusive和unified的coercive apparatus。解释突尼斯和台湾的case的那两张有趣。

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Dictators and their Secret Police 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书