John M. Schuessler is Associate Professor of Strategy at the Air War College.
In Deceit on the Road to War, John M. Schuessler examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit. These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest.
When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases featured in the book—Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq War—test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as contrary to the national interest.
在經典論述中處於國傢間互動層次的戰略欺騙,在精英-民眾分野中的新應用。另外突破既有論斷的是,欺騙不僅僅起到瞭積極的戰略作用,也限定瞭民主政體固有的思想市場、政治監督作用,實際上可能會基於決策者的有限既定信息將國傢拖入災難(不是所有人都像羅斯福智慧且幸運)。戰略欺騙的類型學。
评分在經典論述中處於國傢間互動層次的戰略欺騙,在精英-民眾分野中的新應用。另外突破既有論斷的是,欺騙不僅僅起到瞭積極的戰略作用,也限定瞭民主政體固有的思想市場、政治監督作用,實際上可能會基於決策者的有限既定信息將國傢拖入災難(不是所有人都像羅斯福智慧且幸運)。戰略欺騙的類型學。
评分在經典論述中處於國傢間互動層次的戰略欺騙,在精英-民眾分野中的新應用。另外突破既有論斷的是,欺騙不僅僅起到瞭積極的戰略作用,也限定瞭民主政體固有的思想市場、政治監督作用,實際上可能會基於決策者的有限既定信息將國傢拖入災難(不是所有人都像羅斯福智慧且幸運)。戰略欺騙的類型學。
评分在經典論述中處於國傢間互動層次的戰略欺騙,在精英-民眾分野中的新應用。另外突破既有論斷的是,欺騙不僅僅起到瞭積極的戰略作用,也限定瞭民主政體固有的思想市場、政治監督作用,實際上可能會基於決策者的有限既定信息將國傢拖入災難(不是所有人都像羅斯福智慧且幸運)。戰略欺騙的類型學。
评分在經典論述中處於國傢間互動層次的戰略欺騙,在精英-民眾分野中的新應用。另外突破既有論斷的是,欺騙不僅僅起到瞭積極的戰略作用,也限定瞭民主政體固有的思想市場、政治監督作用,實際上可能會基於決策者的有限既定信息將國傢拖入災難(不是所有人都像羅斯福智慧且幸運)。戰略欺騙的類型學。
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息,本站不存儲任何數據與內容,任何內容與數據均與本站無關,如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 onlinetoolsland.com All Rights Reserved. 本本书屋 版权所有