This book examines the politics and individuals that have shaped the military reform process in the U.S.This book traces the history of various attempts to impose military reform on American armed forces, especially from Congress, from the American Revolution and Continental Congress to the present day. Particular focus will be placed on the effort of a small group in Congress and the Pentagon in the 1980s (who coined the term "military reform" in the modern context). Emphasis will be on the reforms these actors advocated, variously successful and unsuccessful, to fundamentally alter how the Department of Defense designs and buys hardware and how U.S. armed forces fight. The book uses the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War (and the subsequent insurgency in Iraq) to demonstrate what has been reformed in U.S. armed forces and the Department of Defense, and what has not.The volume explains fundamental strengths and weaknesses in America's military forces, exploring what genuine military reform is, what it is not, and what remains to be done. Ideas are presented to compare genuine reform to cosmetic dabbling, which fundamentally improves nothing and which sometimes arrives as ill-conceived fads that promise only to burden U.S. combat forces to the point of mental and physical immobility.Part of the "Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues" series, this is the only current reference book that allows readers to understand the strengths and weaknesses in U.S. military forces. Both authors served in the Pentagon and Congress, and provide unique first-hand analysis regarding military reform.