On Being With Others is an outstanding and compelling uncovering of one of the key questions in philosophy: how can we claim to have knowledge of minds other than our own? On Being With Others clearly shows how the problem of other minds is trapped in a fruitless debate between the sceptical belief that the minds of others cannot be known and those who wish to dispel that scepticism. Simon Glendinning's fascinating analysis of this problem argues that it has polarised debate to such an extent that we do not know how to meet Wittgenstein's famous challenge that 'to see the behaviour of a living thing is to see its soul'. On Being With Others sets out to discover whether Wittgenstein's remark can be justified by drawing on both the analytic and continental traditions. Simon Glendinning explores why early attempts by Austin and Heidegger to reframe scepticism failed before linking this to the philosophy of language. Glendinning draws on the debate between Searle and Derrida and the work of John McDowell to show how a similar, misleading split over meaning has also been created in language. A key feature of the book is how to recast these debates to find out whether we can 'see' behaviour. A challenging and controversial linking of contemporary controversies in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. On Being With Others is essential reading for those interested in a problem that cuts across both analytic and continental philosophy.