Historians, scholars, and military commanders have often been far more concerned with matters of equipment - tanks, airplanes, arms and armour, for example - than with the mind of the commander. But what if the true weak link of the Information Age force is not the hardware of machines, but the software of the human mind? And if so, could it be that the entire conceptual structure of the Information Revolution theorists, at least as it applies to military affairs, is built on sand, on the notorious fickleness of human cognition? These are the questions that this book strives to examine. Looking at the command and control of information-rich warfare, the contributors explore its potential new processes, techniques, and organisational structures. As they do so, they find reasons for both optimism and concerns about the limitations of human cognition and supporting technologies in commanding battles in the Information Age.This work, a combined effort from leading specialists in areas of intelligence gathering, information warfare, future warfare, and more, explores the expanding realm of net-centric warfare and the challenges new methods of war pose for military commanders, from the platoon leader to senior leadership at the highest levels. It represents the culmination of a combined research programme conducted by the U.S. Military and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and has been approved for publication by those agencies.