DIMITRIOS DIAMANTARAS joined the economics department at Temple in 1988, upon completing his Ph.D. studies at the University of Rochester. He has taught many different courses at Temple at all levels, including courses in microecomic and macroeconomic principles, intermediate and graduate microeconomics, game theory, economics of fairness, mathematical economics, the economics of risk and uncertainty, a course he created in 1999, and the economics of arts and culture, a course he created in 2003. His research focuses on public economics, general equilibrium and game theory. His publications have appeared in Economics Letters, Social Choice and Welfare, International Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics, Review of Economic Design, Division of Labour and Transaction Costs, and Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. He was named Fuller Research Fellow for 1998-2000 by the Fox School of Business and Management.

This book combines economic theory and design to create tools that economists can use to apply in social, political and institutional application. It provides readers with the tools to design the rules of economics to harness the power of incentives.

'This is an outstanding book on mechanism design. The fundamentals are superbly presented. And there is considerable advanced material from the last few years of research - also extremely well presented. An instructor could take a second year undergraduate class through the book by using only the introductory passages and the attendant examples, which are excellent. A more advanced undergraduate class can work through the theorems and proofs. Nor is this book out of place at the graduate level.' - Don Campbell, CSX Professor of Economics and Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, USA

'Until now there has not been a good textbook to acquaint students with the field of economic mechanism design. This textbook fills this gap very competently. This book brings together a well-developed introduction to the field, including recent developments in the various branches of this field, as well as applications of the main mechanism design tools to understand many real-life problems. In particular, this text provides tools to understand the proper design of economic policy, which is very welcome in view of the problematic economic policy design for our contemporary complex global economy. A Toolbox for Economic Design provides exactly the right balanced set of material to cover the increasingly important field of economic mechanism design in any bachelor, master or even Ph.D. program in economics.' - Robert P. Gilles, Professor of Economics, Virginia Tech, USA