Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, now presents a full exposition and defence of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions. Deliberately avoiding a combative stance, she finds less disagreement between Kantian and neo-Aristotelian approaches than is usual, and she offers the first account from a virtue ethics perspective of acting 'from a sense of duty'. She considers the question which character traits are virtues, and explores how answers to this question can be justified by appeal to facts about human nature. Written in a clear, engaging style which makes it accessible to non-specialists, On Virtue Ethics will appeal to anyone with an interest in moral philosophy.
具體描述
讀後感
用戶評價
看哭瞭，她想反駁她的理論不是啥也沒說，但她的論述和她的理論一樣，說瞭一大堆，啥也沒論證齣來。簡單來說，就是啥也沒有
评分雖然論證上有很多問題，但是因為是女性所以錶示支持
评分雖然論證上有很多問題，但是因為是女性所以錶示支持
评分雖然論證上有很多問題，但是因為是女性所以錶示支持
评分雖然論證上有很多問題，但是因為是女性所以錶示支持
相關圖書
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息，本站不存儲任何數據與內容，任何內容與數據均與本站無關，如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度，google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 onlinetoolsland.com All Rights Reserved. 本本书屋 版权所有