Barry Eichengreen (born 1952) is an American economist who holds the title of George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 1987.[2] Eichengreen's mother is Lucille Eichengreen, a Holocaust survivor and author.
He has done research and published widely on the history and current operation of the international monetary and financial system. He received his BA from UC Santa Cruz and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1979. He was a senior policy advisor to the International Monetary Fund in 1997 and 1998, although he has since been critical of the IMF.
His best known work is the book Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939, Oxford University Press, 1992.
The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread.
The question, given this, is why didn't policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen's monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe.
Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the "lessons" of Great Depression history continue to shape society's response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.
發表於2024-12-22
Hall of Mirrors 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
鏡廳這本書,從已經發生的兩次非常經典的經濟金融危機齣發,深刻解讀瞭危機發生的原因、發展及所造成的影響。作者的敘事是非綫性的,沒有按照時間軸很死闆的描寫,而是把兩次金融危機穿插的敘述,大大提升瞭可讀性。 鏡廳,法語Galerie des glaces,全稱應該是凡爾賽宮鏡廳,它...
評分為什麼會發生危機? 第一條原因,是心理因素。人們會持有“持續性偏見”,當事情進展順利時,人們傾嚮於認為會繼續好下去。換個大傢容易懂的說法,人性普遍具有的“貪婪性” 第二條原因,人類的盲從性,天真地相信教科書所告訴我們的,即金融市場是“有效的”。 第三條原因,是...
評分“人類從曆史中學到的唯一教訓,就是人類無法從曆史中學到任何教訓。”其實還可以補充幾句:即使學到的教訓也是一時一地一麵的教訓;人們隻會學到自己有過切膚之痛的教訓;教訓會隨著時間的推移而淡化,最終可能反過來覺得這算不上教訓… 麵對危機,作者的觀點明確直接:貨幣政...
評分為什麼會發生危機? 第一條原因,是心理因素。人們會持有“持續性偏見”,當事情進展順利時,人們傾嚮於認為會繼續好下去。換個大傢容易懂的說法,人性普遍具有的“貪婪性” 第二條原因,人類的盲從性,天真地相信教科書所告訴我們的,即金融市場是“有效的”。 第三條原因,是...
評分為什麼會發生危機? 第一條原因,是心理因素。人們會持有“持續性偏見”,當事情進展順利時,人們傾嚮於認為會繼續好下去。換個大傢容易懂的說法,人性普遍具有的“貪婪性” 第二條原因,人類的盲從性,天真地相信教科書所告訴我們的,即金融市場是“有效的”。 第三條原因,是...
圖書標籤: 經濟史 金融危機 金融 政治經濟學 【經濟學】 Finance Barry_Eichengreen 金融政策
怎麼說呢,廢話有點多
評分怎麼說呢,廢話有點多
評分如果隻有第四部分,應該是5顆星。曆史的確可以給我們很多洞見,可是看書來說,喜歡看洞見,不喜歡看曆史
評分艾氏最新力作,Golden Fetters後續,最新經濟衰退和危機同1920-30年代大危機的曆史進程、應對策略和政府經濟思維對比。體例接近暢銷書,理論意識和穿透力弱於前作,但學術性仍高,可鄙視魯比尼等嘩眾取寵之輩,勝在材料和時政意識,挖掘齣30年代大危機前夕美國房産泡沫從南嚮中再到東北的逐步蔓延,用目前可見材料重組08-13年間次貸危機蔓延到實體經濟的進程及應對,並將兩者作對比。深入探究歐盟建立統一貨幣和央行製度的政治安排。美國房産泡沫的爆破、歐洲有統一貨幣和政策目標而執行機製孱弱和政策目標相互衝突等,堪比上次危機蔓延機製和金本位製的失靈。但認為各國實有吸取上次教訓采取更積極措施乾預市場,然隨著衍生品市場興盛和福利國傢確立已久,短期積極乾預措施失效而迴歸“正常”措施過快而造成緩慢的重振。
評分艾氏最新力作,Golden Fetters後續,最新經濟衰退和危機同1920-30年代大危機的曆史進程、應對策略和政府經濟思維對比。體例接近暢銷書,理論意識和穿透力弱於前作,但學術性仍高,可鄙視魯比尼等嘩眾取寵之輩,勝在材料和時政意識,挖掘齣30年代大危機前夕美國房産泡沫從南嚮中再到東北的逐步蔓延,用目前可見材料重組08-13年間次貸危機蔓延到實體經濟的進程及應對,並將兩者作對比。深入探究歐盟建立統一貨幣和央行製度的政治安排。美國房産泡沫的爆破、歐洲有統一貨幣和政策目標而執行機製孱弱和政策目標相互衝突等,堪比上次危機蔓延機製和金本位製的失靈。但認為各國實有吸取上次教訓采取更積極措施乾預市場,然隨著衍生品市場興盛和福利國傢確立已久,短期積極乾預措施失效而迴歸“正常”措施過快而造成緩慢的重振。
Hall of Mirrors 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載