发表于2024-12-23
The Statebuilder's Dilemma 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书
图书标签: 政治学 国际关系 国家建设 IR 院生时期 比较政治学 安全研究 DavidLake
The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder’s Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader’s legitimacy at home.
In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.
尽管(外部的)国家建设者们可以成为失败国家中社会秩序的催化剂,但是只有在此过程中能实现自身利益的国家会承担起这项责任。国家建设者在该国的利益诉求越大,其就越有可能支持一个“忠诚的”(loyal)领导上台,而这所导致的结果恰恰是缺乏“合法性”(legitimacy)。这便是国际建设者的困境,他们一方面想要对象国的新领导对其忠诚,另一方面又希望这些领导人有足够的合法性驾驭社会。
评分尽管(外部的)国家建设者们可以成为失败国家中社会秩序的催化剂,但是只有在此过程中能实现自身利益的国家会承担起这项责任。国家建设者在该国的利益诉求越大,其就越有可能支持一个“忠诚的”(loyal)领导上台,而这所导致的结果恰恰是缺乏“合法性”(legitimacy)。这便是国际建设者的困境,他们一方面想要对象国的新领导对其忠诚,另一方面又希望这些领导人有足够的合法性驾驭社会。
评分尽管(外部的)国家建设者们可以成为失败国家中社会秩序的催化剂,但是只有在此过程中能实现自身利益的国家会承担起这项责任。国家建设者在该国的利益诉求越大,其就越有可能支持一个“忠诚的”(loyal)领导上台,而这所导致的结果恰恰是缺乏“合法性”(legitimacy)。这便是国际建设者的困境,他们一方面想要对象国的新领导对其忠诚,另一方面又希望这些领导人有足够的合法性驾驭社会。
评分尽管(外部的)国家建设者们可以成为失败国家中社会秩序的催化剂,但是只有在此过程中能实现自身利益的国家会承担起这项责任。国家建设者在该国的利益诉求越大,其就越有可能支持一个“忠诚的”(loyal)领导上台,而这所导致的结果恰恰是缺乏“合法性”(legitimacy)。这便是国际建设者的困境,他们一方面想要对象国的新领导对其忠诚,另一方面又希望这些领导人有足够的合法性驾驭社会。
评分尽管(外部的)国家建设者们可以成为失败国家中社会秩序的催化剂,但是只有在此过程中能实现自身利益的国家会承担起这项责任。国家建设者在该国的利益诉求越大,其就越有可能支持一个“忠诚的”(loyal)领导上台,而这所导致的结果恰恰是缺乏“合法性”(legitimacy)。这便是国际建设者的困境,他们一方面想要对象国的新领导对其忠诚,另一方面又希望这些领导人有足够的合法性驾驭社会。
The Statebuilder's Dilemma 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书