A Matter of Interpretation

安东宁·斯卡利亚，美国法学家，曾任美国联邦最高法院大法官，1986年由里根总统任命。是美国联邦最高法院保守主义阵营中的中坚人物，也是美国联邦最高法院服务时间最长和最资深的大法官。之前曾任职于哥伦比亚特区美国联邦上诉法院，并执教于弗吉尼亚大学和芝加哥大学，毕业于乔治城大学，获哈佛大学法学硕士学位。2016年2月13日去世。

出版者:Princeton University Press

作者:Antonin Scalia

页数:174

出版时间:1998-07-27

价格:USD 19.95

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780691004006

图书标签:法学美国宪法

We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim - 'distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal-good law'. But is this common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative.In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law.He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the 'strict constructionism' that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly 'smuggle' in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals. This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia's ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints.

用户评价

文本主义，以语境来理解文本。斯卡利亚抨击原旨主义和动态解释，也不同意道德解读。

德沃金的评议一出手就不同凡响

textualism耶耶耶。

德沃金的评议一出手就不同凡响

文本主义，以语境来理解文本。斯卡利亚抨击原旨主义和动态解释，也不同意道德解读。