The IMF and Economic Development 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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发表于2024-05-16

The IMF and Economic Development 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:James Vreeland

出品人:

页数:216

译者:

出版时间:2010-1-22

价格:GBP 23.99

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780521016957

丛书系列:

图书标签: 国际政治经济学政治学国际关系 OperationKutuzov 国际制度发展经济学

The IMF and Economic Development 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书图书描述

Why do governments turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with what effects? This book argues that governments enter IMF programs for economic and political reasons, and finds that the effects are negative on economic growth and income distribution. By bringing in the IMF, governments gain political leverage - via conditionality - to push through unpopular policies. Note that if governments desiring conditions are more likely to participate, estimating program effects is not straightforward: one must control for the potentially unobserved political determinants of selection. This book addresses the selection problem using a dynamic bivariate version of the Heckman model analyzing cross-national time-series data. The main finding is that the negative effects of IMF programs on economic growth are mitigated for certain constituencies since programs also have distributional consequences. But IMF programs doubly hurt the least well off in society: they lower growth and shift the income distribution upward.

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通过与IMF签署协议，行政机构将其对经济改革的政策偏好与IMF的条件捆绑起来。一个国家的行政机构可以独自与IMF签署协议，但为遵守IMF条件而进行的政策改变则需要否决行为体的同意。IMF的卷入提高了反对行政机构倡议的成本，因为反对的对象不再仅仅是行政机构而是IMF。（p14）书中第二章用了坦桑尼亚、尼日利亚、乌拉圭的案例，意在说明为何有些国家在非常需要贷款时不与IMF签订协议，而另一些国家在不那么需要贷款时为何与IMF签订协议。

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