The Politics of Authoritarian Rule pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載2025
- 政治學
- 威權主義
- 比較政治
- 政治
- 獨裁政治
- 民主轉型
- 英文原版
- 比較政治學
What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
具體描述
讀後感
用戶評價
作者無疑是該路徑的集大成者。總體來講，權力分享部分比威權控製要精彩。
评分威權主義的討論既繁，對知識的再結構化也就呼之欲齣，Svolik這本書正好起到這樣的作用，故而占據節點，廣受徵引。雖組織完備，但邏輯似嫌簡單，未得深透。倒是更欣賞他劃分民主/威權毫不妥協的二分法，有一點春鞦筆意方能不落庸俗，顯露精神。
评分作者無疑是該路徑的集大成者。總體來講，權力分享部分比威權控製要精彩。
评分PE Core
评分當領導人和盟友的權力分布相對平衡時，盟友可以做齣有效懲罰（替換）領導人的可信威脅，從而阻止個人專權，維持權力分享。一旦領導人實力明顯強於盟友（依靠革命鬥爭時的聲望和功績，或憑藉信息優勢逐步竊取個人權力），盟友將無力阻止個人專權的齣現，權力分享走嚮破裂。 由於強大到足以消滅任何盟友，個人專權局麵幾乎不可能由內部打破，而隻能是外部入侵、民眾起義或領導人的自然死亡。
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