The Logic of Collective Action

Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.

出版者:Harvard University Press

作者:Mancur Olson

页数:186

出版时间:1971-1-1

价格:USD 31.50

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780674537514

图书标签:经济学政治学社会学集体行动economics社会理论奥尔森MancurOlson

承接 住宅 自建房 室内改造 装修设计 免费咨询 QQ：624617358 一级注册建筑师 亲自为您回答、经验丰富，价格亲民。无论项目大小，都全力服务。期待合作，欢迎咨询！QQ：624617358

This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

读后感

大致地看了一下奥尔森的《集体行动的逻辑》，总感觉着一直在围绕着一个主题——“利益”，各种各样的利益，无论哪种行为，最终都会被归结为简单的利益，这的确也是十分简单的道理，或许这与我们曾经接受过的一些东西发生了冲突，给人一种三观混乱的感觉，我不知道该如何评价他...  

奥尔森教授阐述了一个社会科学研究中的最基本的问题：集体行动会发生吗？传统智慧（加尔布雷斯）认为：集体的存在是为了增进集体的利益，理性的集体成员都会为了集体的利益而行动，也即亚当斯密提到的理性的个人采取行动，达致的结果是社会的共同利益，换言之就是个人理性会导...

1.最近又翻看了一下这本书，买了10几年，书都发黄了。 2.原理仍然没问题，但时代多了互联网，结论可能会有较大变化。 3.行动成本与收益的测量是奥尔森理论的基础。 4.由于互联网的出现，行动成本，尤其是行动的串联成本大大降低，因此，在这个意义上，大集团的行动性质向小集团...  

我一直想不清楚工会的问题。认同经济学原理的人，基本都会认可，工会对于工人作为一整体的福祉是有害无益的。如果在劳动力市场上有许多剩余劳力，老板要是受不了工会了，只需要把工人全都辞退，雇一批新人就可以了（当然为此要付一点成本）。工会的作用，只不过给劳动力市场增...  

本书主要的观点可以概括为小集团可以为共同的集体利益提供低于最有供给水平的集体物品且提供这种物品所应分担的责任存在“以小欺大”的现象；但是大集团由于存在搭便车等问题很难为集体物品（目标）采取一致的行动。但是如果在具体的某类大集团中采取强制、选择性激励就可能...  

用户评价

对于此书褒扬和运用已经甚多，无须赘述。反而有另外几点值得提出。一是，运用此书经常是批评大政府、阶级政治等理念的无效，因为个人不肯贡献力量取得公共品，但其实更好的运用可能是“逆用”或针对其问题的思考，即如何针对理性个人维护私利的特性，设计出有效的激励或威慑体制动员个人投身组织；二是，奥尔森把组织的公共品和选择性激励/私人收益截然分开，似乎值得商榷，这两者或许在有重合的时候能鼓励个人行动（如诺斯所言），选择性激励也可以是所得公共品的优先分配—所以这里公共利益在组织行动前后的性质会发生嬗变？三是，奥尔森的理论已经指明了交易成本（他称为谈判成本）在组织中的重要作用，比新制度经济学诸君早；最后，不同于许多时人，书中清楚表示理性人和经济理论运用有其局限，此书无法涵盖许多社会政治宗教方面集体行动。

Mancur Olson是个天才

第一章看了好久还是云里雾里，果然还是不适合学经济。。

Mancur Olson是个天才

这本写得真挺好看的。果然喜欢case呢