Michael Suk-Young Chwe is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge.
Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way.
By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it.
In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge, both in the real world and in experiments, and considers how generating common knowledge has become easier in the digital age.
發表於2024-12-24
Rational Ritual 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
圖書標籤: 社會學 政治 博弈論 【事業】 美國 自我啓發 經濟學 社會科學
很有趣的概念,延展度也很寬。但是舉的例子太過時,基本都集中在90年代,尤其是沒拿我大天朝的信息管製舉例真是太可惜瞭:)
評分從博弈論角度深入探討瞭各種儀式典禮、媒體事件背後的原理,作者認為,這些活動的目的都是要創造“共同知識”,而共同知識是解決“協調問題”的不二法門。 創造共同知識需要信息的周知。藉助於各種儀式、典禮、高曝光的媒體活動等,我們可以讓一條信息被所有人知道。可以說,文化軟因素不知不覺影響著我們的理性決定。 強關係有助於協調集體行為
評分紮剋伯格2015年推薦圖書,此書從博弈論的角度探討瞭君主製、製度改革、宗教和儀式等話題,讀完此書更好的瞭解瞭某些曆史事件,例如法國大革命後齣現瞭一係列的革命紀念日、宣誓就職儀式,就連度量單位也發生瞭改變,米和厘米就齣現在那個時候,同時靠右通行也齣現在那個時候,清初多爾袞為什麼要“剃發留辮”,此書都給齣瞭一種視角。(中文版貌似已經絕版)
評分紮剋伯格2015年推薦圖書,此書從博弈論的角度探討瞭君主製、製度改革、宗教和儀式等話題,讀完此書更好的瞭解瞭某些曆史事件,例如法國大革命後齣現瞭一係列的革命紀念日、宣誓就職儀式,就連度量單位也發生瞭改變,米和厘米就齣現在那個時候,同時靠右通行也齣現在那個時候,清初多爾袞為什麼要“剃發留辮”,此書都給齣瞭一種視角。(中文版貌似已經絕版)
評分從博弈論角度深入探討瞭各種儀式典禮、媒體事件背後的原理,作者認為,這些活動的目的都是要創造“共同知識”,而共同知識是解決“協調問題”的不二法門。 創造共同知識需要信息的周知。藉助於各種儀式、典禮、高曝光的媒體活動等,我們可以讓一條信息被所有人知道。可以說,文化軟因素不知不覺影響著我們的理性決定。 強關係有助於協調集體行為
Rational Ritual 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載