The Challenger Launch Decision

出版者:University Of Chicago Press

作者:Diane Vaughan

页数:592

出版时间:1996

价格:USD 40.00

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9780226851754

图书标签:社会学美国管理学Sociology组织行为学组织社会学社会组织思维

The explosion of space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, and the death of the seven astronauts aboard had a major impact on American culture, with many people still vividly remembering exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, this book uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. The author reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster stemmed from the banality of organizational life. This work explains why the Challenger tragedy must be re-examined and seeks to offer a warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age.

用户评价

文笔真好：The key to accepting risk in the past was what I called "the normalization of deviance": having accepted anomalous O-ring performance once, precedent became the basis for accepting it again and again. The normalization was a product of NASA's organizational system: the connection between environment, organization, and individual interpretation

A excellent sociological perspective on the Challenger launch decision not as rule violations and misconduct but as conformity and normalized mistake. Worthy reading :)

文笔真好：The key to accepting risk in the past was what I called "the normalization of deviance": having accepted anomalous O-ring performance once, precedent became the basis for accepting it again and again. The normalization was a product of NASA's organizational system: the connection between environment, organization, and individual interpretation

A excellent sociological perspective on the Challenger launch decision not as rule violations and misconduct but as conformity and normalized mistake. Worthy reading :)

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