Introduction 3
1. Preview 4
2. A Perspective on Action 5
3. Flexibility: A Mark of Motivation 7
I Motivation and Action
-1. Motivation and Desire 13
1. What Is Motivation? What Is the Question? 13
2. Motivation, Desire, and Action-Desire 15
3. Providing Motivation and Motivational Bases 19
4. Desire and Direction of Fit 25
5. Intention and Desire 27
6. Desire’s Breadth 28
7. Occurrent versus Standing Desires 30
8. Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Desires 33
9. Summary of Some Technical Terms 34
-2. Goal-Directed Action 38
1. Davidson’s Challenge and Two Unsuccessful Replies 38
2. Two More Unsuccessful Replies 45
3. Causalism and Primary Deviance 51
4. A Myth About Simple Agents 54
5. Handling Primary Deviance 58
II Motivation and Normativity
-3. Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons 69
1. Davidsonian Reasons for Action 70
2. Arational Actions 71
3. Scanlon on Reasons and the “Standard Desire Model” 76
4. Motivational and Normative Reasons for Action 79
5. External and Broadly Davidsonian Reasons for Action 81
-4. The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning 86
1. Another Promethean Tale 86
2. The Antecedent Motivation Theory 89
3. Some Unsuccessful Arguments for the Antecedent Motivation Theory 91
4. Antecedent Motivation versus the Cognitive Engine 92
-5. Implications of the Antecedent Motivation Theory? 101
5. Moral Motivation and Moral Ought-Beliefs: Internalism versus Externalism 107
1. Internalism 108
2. Present Concerns 110
3. Introducing Listlessness 111
4. Testing 113
5. Belief, Belief*, and SP-Belief 117
6. Listlessness Again 121
7. An Alleged Problem with Generic Moral Desires 123
8. Modest Cognitivist Internalism: Problems 125
-6. Attitudes That Essentially Encompass Motivation to Act 134
1. A Preliminary Thesis 135
2. Action-Desires and a Hypothesis 138
3. The Hypothesis Tested 142
4. Further Testing: Negative Actions 146
5. A Refinement and a Worry About Circularity 154
III Strength and Control
-7. Motivational Strength 161
1. Some Background 162
2. MSI and Vacuity 164
3. MSI and Associated Principles 166
4. Action-Desires and Ordinary Dispositions 172
5. MSI and Agency 174
-8. Control and Self-Control 177
1. Background 177
2. Libet’s Studies 180
3. Urges, Intentions, and Actions 184
4. Branching Out 189
IV Decision, Agency, and Belief
-9. Deciding 197
1. Background: Four Views of Practical Decision 197
2. Intentions in Practical Deciding 202
3. Are Practical Decisions Inexplicable? 205
4. Practical Deciding 209
-10. Human Agency par Excellence 215
1. Human Agents 216
2. Velleman’s Objection to the “Standard Story” 218
3. Human Action par Excellence and a Special Desire 219
4. Deciding and Reduction 224
5. Alienation and the Elusive Location of Human Agency par Excellence 225
6. Causalism, Real Selves, and Human Agents 230
-11. Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations 234
1. Motivationally Biased Belief and a Theory 234
2. Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations 238
3. Reasons-Explanations and Motivational Explanations 242
4. Conclusion 243
References 247
Index 257
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