When do elected incumbent leaders accept democratic rules, and when are they willing to manipulate these rules raising the specter—and in some cases creating the reality—of dictatorship? Many ambitious presidents throughout the world attempt to circumvent restrictions on the executive power. Yet, if these leaders have to surrender all these powers and step down, as stipulated by presidential term limits, then dictators they are not. In this book, Alexander Baturo examines the onset of personalism—the breakdown of term limits—in democratic, partly democratic, and even nondemocratic regimes around the world since 1960. Investigating the factors that encourage playing by the rules or manipulating those same rules, Baturo asks what is at stake for the chief executive if he relinquishes office. The argument centers on the costs and benefits of leaving office at the end of the president's term. Drawing on original data collection and fieldwork, Baturo finds that the income-generating capacity of political office in states where rent-seeking is prevalent, as well as concerns over future immunity and status, determines whether or not an executive attempts to retain power beyond the mandated period. Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits will appeal to scholars of democratization and executive power as well as political theorists.