Pepper Culpepper joined the EUI as Professor of Political Science in January 2010. His research focuses on the intersection between capitalism and democracy, both in politics and in public policy.
His book Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (Cambridge University Press 2011), was awarded the 2012 Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. He is the author of Creating Cooperation (Cornell University Press, 2003) and co-editor of Changing France (with Peter Hall and Bruno Palier, Palgrave 2006) and of The German Skills Machine (with David Finegold, Berghahn Books 1999).
His work has appeared in Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Politics & Society, Socio-Economic Review, World Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, West European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Public Policy, and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy. A former Marshall Scholar at Oxford University, he has also held long-term visiting appointments in France, Germany, and Japan.
发表于2024-12-23
Quiet Politics and Business Power 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书
图书标签: 比较政治 日本政治 社会 比较政治经济学 政治经济学 影像 公共政策 ComparativePolitics
Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries – France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands – explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control – specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.
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评分民主政治中正式与非正式政治博弈机制、企业管理体制改革的政治过程、商业的权力来源。友好并购和恶意收购均在一定程度上影响大小股东和高级经理人员的权益,故并购收购管理是一国企业管制自由度的重要标志。股权在股东中的分散度(决定控制企业所需股权比例)和恶意收购占全部收购比例(企业股权易手频繁程度)代表了股东和经理人对企业投入的“耐心资本”。尽管民主政治有正式法律、选举和议会投票等机制,但相对复杂艰深的企业控制问题往往不会进入政治议程中心,难以获得中位投票者关注,更多依赖非正式体制如商团与政治精英之结盟互动。企业控制在政治议程中的地位和正式非正式体制之强弱对比定管制问题上的政治交锋模式,也是商业权力来源之一。德法荷日比较:正式非正式制度的强度与效用,企业相互持股和利益共同体的强度,高级经理人团体的活动。
Quiet Politics and Business Power 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书