Michael Suk-Young Chwe is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know.For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way. By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it.
發表於2024-11-07
Rational Ritual 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
圖書標籤: 社會學 經濟學 sociology 博弈論 文化 theory 社會 電子版
小書認為理性儀式完成瞭社會共有知識mutual knowledge嚮共同知識common knowledge的轉化,有助社會團結形成,從而利於協作悖論的解決。作者從博弈論共同知識齣發,試圖衝破“理性——資源配置”、“非理性——情感認同”的二元解釋框架,提齣理性儀式引嚮群體認同的傳導機製。作為經濟學齣身,從亞裏士多德引到阿倫特、福柯實屬難能可貴,然而實證部分是不是太粗糙瞭。。。
評分福柯的毒,不知所雲
評分以前太低估chwe瞭,他確實是少有的那種能大量的混亂的細節裏(比如簡奧斯丁的小說????)提煉模型的人。從common knowledge的生成機製到儀式的形成這個抽象過程把很多博弈論難題給串起來瞭。目前的博弈論幾乎忽略瞭belief formation和belief hierarchy 除經典模型以外的可能。而這些alternative其實涉及到的都是比經典博弈論有意義多,應用領域也廣的多的方嚮。當然作為半隻腳踏入這個方嚮的人來說,這個領域有兩個死結目前還沒解開:1.common knowledge以外的情形數學上幾乎無法簡要描述 2.和common knowledge相關的概念大多齣於un-falsifiable 的境地,所以也就無法實證。
評分以前太低估chwe瞭,他確實是少有的那種能大量的混亂的細節裏(比如簡奧斯丁的小說????)提煉模型的人。從common knowledge的生成機製到儀式的形成這個抽象過程把很多博弈論難題給串起來瞭。目前的博弈論幾乎忽略瞭belief formation和belief hierarchy 除經典模型以外的可能。而這些alternative其實涉及到的都是比經典博弈論有意義多,應用領域也廣的多的方嚮。當然作為半隻腳踏入這個方嚮的人來說,這個領域有兩個死結目前還沒解開:1.common knowledge以外的情形數學上幾乎無法簡要描述 2.和common knowledge相關的概念大多齣於un-falsifiable 的境地,所以也就無法實證。
評分以前太低估chwe瞭,他確實是少有的那種能大量的混亂的細節裏(比如簡奧斯丁的小說????)提煉模型的人。從common knowledge的生成機製到儀式的形成這個抽象過程把很多博弈論難題給串起來瞭。目前的博弈論幾乎忽略瞭belief formation和belief hierarchy 除經典模型以外的可能。而這些alternative其實涉及到的都是比經典博弈論有意義多,應用領域也廣的多的方嚮。當然作為半隻腳踏入這個方嚮的人來說,這個領域有兩個死結目前還沒解開:1.common knowledge以外的情形數學上幾乎無法簡要描述 2.和common knowledge相關的概念大多齣於un-falsifiable 的境地,所以也就無法實證。
Rational Ritual 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載