Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
發表於2024-05-13
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
政治經濟學最近成為一個很熱的話題。Acemoglu美國MIT的教授,成為這個領域最火熱的代錶人物。其一年在top5雜誌上發錶文章的速度,也讓同行們望其項背。而在這本《economic origin of dictatorship and democracy》書籍中,作者又展示瞭自己的大抱負,大誌嚮。而作為研究經濟學...
評分民主齣現的可能性—由權貴和民眾間的博弈成本決定的。 本質上是一種對未來權力分配的可信承諾。 民主—製度—民眾擁有的政治權利達到高峰,權貴的政策讓步又不可信的情況下齣現。 影響民主化和民主化鞏固的重要因素—經濟不平等,權貴的收入來源,全球化 核心觀點:民主是一種...
評分民主齣現的可能性—由權貴和民眾間的博弈成本決定的。 本質上是一種對未來權力分配的可信承諾。 民主—製度—民眾擁有的政治權利達到高峰,權貴的政策讓步又不可信的情況下齣現。 影響民主化和民主化鞏固的重要因素—經濟不平等,權貴的收入來源,全球化 核心觀點:民主是一種...
評分他們的argument是這樣的: 非民主製度有利於精英的經濟利益分配,民主製度有利於大眾的經濟利益分配。 是否民主取決於精英和大眾的政治力量。 政治力量分兩種:事實上的和法理上的。 事實政治力量是短暫集結的,過期就會消失,但事實力量能幫助精英或大眾奪權,體現在政變和民...
評分政治經濟學最近成為一個很熱的話題。Acemoglu美國MIT的教授,成為這個領域最火熱的代錶人物。其一年在top5雜誌上發錶文章的速度,也讓同行們望其項背。而在這本《economic origin of dictatorship and democracy》書籍中,作者又展示瞭自己的大抱負,大誌嚮。而作為研究經濟學...
圖書標籤: 政治經濟學 經濟學 economics 政治學 Acemoglu 政治 社會學 politics
role of political power (de jure vs de facto) and role of political institutions in allocating future political power; nature of poli- and eco- structure, structure of economy, collective-action, cost and benefit; social conflict as main driving force that leads to different in political institutions.
評分難怪有些人覺得現在經濟學傢來做政治科學是不負責,這都是什麼啊。
評分經濟學傢對政治學的逆襲啊。早就聽說過,今天終於藉瞭一本,嶄新的,讓人萌生無窮閱讀欲。贊曰:大神齣手,學界顫抖。模型不醜,自甘俯首。
評分我還是買paperback吧,省錢。2011年12月,不要好高騖遠。
評分上帝:你們說民主轉型和鞏固最重要的因素是什麼。亞柏二老:人性和財産。熊彼特:嗬嗬。李普塞特:經濟和社會進步。摩爾:地主階級嚮商業資本傢的轉化。達爾:多元利益分化。亨廷頓:一係列現代化指標,政治製度和大眾參與的適配。奧唐奈、林茨、斯蒂潘:因素好多啊組閤好不一樣,具體問題具體分析,不過威權精英分化很重要。Boix:經濟不平等程度,資本流動性。唐斯:你確定民主瞭就會好?AR:呐我們首先假設人都是理性的再分成幾組每組的利益和偏好是什麼接下來看我博弈論模型12345678……然後我們就什麼都解釋瞭!上帝:……你們最牛逼羅。
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載