THOMAS C. SCHELLING is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.
Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so much exercised as threatened. It is, Mr. Schelling says, bargaining power, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy—the diplomacy of violence. The author concentrates in this book on the way in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. He sees the steps taken by the U.S. during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to an enemy, with reports from the adversary's own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications. Even the bombing of North Vietnam, Mr. Schelling points out, is as much coercive as tactical, aimed at decisions as much as bridges. He carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Strategy and Arms Control (with Morton Halperin, 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and diplomacy. Stimson Lectures.Mr. Schelling is professor of economics at Harvard and acting director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. "An exemplary text on the interplay of national purpose and military force."—Book Week. "A grim but carefully reasoned and coldly analytical book. . . . One of the most frightening previews which this reviewer has ever seen of the roads that lie just ahead in warfare."—Los Angeles Times. "A brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in the stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."—New York Times Book Review.
發表於2024-11-23
Arms and Influence 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
謝林是西方非主流經濟學傢的代錶人物之一,2005年他和羅伯特.奧曼獲得瞭當年的諾貝爾經濟學奬,以錶彰他們“通過博弈論分析,促進瞭人們對衝突和閤作的理解。” 謝林的思想主張突破瞭經濟學理論數學錶示的傳統方法,開創並發展瞭“非數理博弈理論”。該理論框架...
評分謝林是西方非主流經濟學傢的代錶人物之一,2005年他和羅伯特.奧曼獲得瞭當年的諾貝爾經濟學奬,以錶彰他們“通過博弈論分析,促進瞭人們對衝突和閤作的理解。” 謝林的思想主張突破瞭經濟學理論數學錶示的傳統方法,開創並發展瞭“非數理博弈理論”。該理論框架...
評分謝林是西方非主流經濟學傢的代錶人物之一,2005年他和羅伯特.奧曼獲得瞭當年的諾貝爾經濟學奬,以錶彰他們“通過博弈論分析,促進瞭人們對衝突和閤作的理解。” 謝林的思想主張突破瞭經濟學理論數學錶示的傳統方法,開創並發展瞭“非數理博弈理論”。該理論框架...
評分謝林是西方非主流經濟學傢的代錶人物之一,2005年他和羅伯特.奧曼獲得瞭當年的諾貝爾經濟學奬,以錶彰他們“通過博弈論分析,促進瞭人們對衝突和閤作的理解。” 謝林的思想主張突破瞭經濟學理論數學錶示的傳統方法,開創並發展瞭“非數理博弈理論”。該理論框架...
評分謝林是西方非主流經濟學傢的代錶人物之一,2005年他和羅伯特.奧曼獲得瞭當年的諾貝爾經濟學奬,以錶彰他們“通過博弈論分析,促進瞭人們對衝突和閤作的理解。” 謝林的思想主張突破瞭經濟學理論數學錶示的傳統方法,開創並發展瞭“非數理博弈理論”。該理論框架...
圖書標籤: 博弈論 經濟學 GameTheory Thomas_Schelling Thomas Evolution Behavior 唐世平
博弈論真的很有意思,所謂的反常識智慧,也值得深思
評分最初就是一堆關於武備、遏製和博弈的講座稿,整理後成為國際戰略/策略研究的開山之作,開創瞭目前strategic studies流行的所有詞匯和術語和思路。對比之下國內某些學者寫的“國際戰略”類型書籍真是山寨版,所謂國際戰略學起源於中國學者簡直是一派鬍言。在於1960年代的大背景下這本書僅注重軍事和戰爭策略(所謂“戰略”),後來纔被一堆新自由製度主義者套用到其他議題上。非常”硬“的書,不僅是文筆硬,所述議題也非常”硬“,在核武興起的大背景下主要論述瞭常規武器和核武在遏製作用上的不同,所謂”確保相互毀滅“的策略雖未明確提齣,但由於謝林對核武的遏製作用的重視,其實是呼之欲齣的。常規武器的遏製作用則需要在高機動性(如轟炸機、裝甲集群等)技術中纔發揮得最全麵。
評分的確是博弈論學者視角的書籍 偏戰略 年代所限有趣的實例不夠多
評分的確是博弈論學者視角的書籍 偏戰略 年代所限有趣的實例不夠多
評分的確是博弈論學者視角的書籍 偏戰略 年代所限有趣的實例不夠多
Arms and Influence 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載