Timothy Besley, Professor of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics
What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses of government usually divide into two broad camps. One which emphasizes government as a force for public good that can regulate markets, distribute resources and generally work towards improving the lives of its citizens. The other sees government as driven by private interests, susceptible to those with the power to influence its decisions and failing to incentivize its officials to act for the greater public good. This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, the Publius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to act for the public good but also accepts the fact that things often go wrong. It shares the view that there are certain institutional preconditions for effective government but then proceed to examine exactly what those preconditions are. Timothy Besley emphasises that it is not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework but also about understanding the way incentives work and the process by which the political class is selected.
發表於2024-12-22
Principled Agents? 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
圖書標籤: 政治經濟學 經濟學 政治學 economics politics 經濟 比較政治 民主
Besley的一大貢獻在於放鬆politicion完全自利的假設,允許政客具有intrinsic motivation(為人民服務的動機)因而政客存在好壞之分,把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本書大緻是對此理論的一個早期介紹,並不是綜述。如果把2005 JEP文章對政治選拔的討論結閤進來就更好瞭。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入瞭個大坑# 2017.12.26
評分Besley的一大貢獻在於放鬆politicion完全自利的假設,允許政客具有intrinsic motivation(為人民服務的動機)因而政客存在好壞之分,把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本書大緻是對此理論的一個早期介紹,並不是綜述。如果把2005 JEP文章對政治選拔的討論結閤進來就更好瞭。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入瞭個大坑# 2017.12.26
評分Besley的一大貢獻在於放鬆politicion完全自利的假設,允許政客具有intrinsic motivation(為人民服務的動機)因而政客存在好壞之分,把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本書大緻是對此理論的一個早期介紹,並不是綜述。如果把2005 JEP文章對政治選拔的討論結閤進來就更好瞭。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入瞭個大坑# 2017.12.26
評分這書真不錯,a must-read for political economy.
評分整體來說,一本溫吞,不太引人入勝的書。政府的作用,不該被過度的美化或期望,也不該一味的看到為己謀私所以覺得它不應該存在,更好的製度讓它更多地發揮好的作用吧。
Principled Agents? 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載