Moral Luck pdf epub mobi txt 電子書下載2025

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伯納德·威廉斯（Bernard Williams，1929-2003），早年在英國牛津大學研究哲學和古典學，曾先後擔任倫敦大學、劍橋大學、牛津大學和美國加利福尼亞大學伯剋利分校的哲學教授。他於1970年被選為英國社會科學院院士，之後又當選為美國藝術與科學院外籍院士，並在1999年因其在哲學上的重大貢獻而被授予爵位。

威廉斯的主要工作領域是倫理學、知識論、心靈哲學和政治哲學。他在早期希臘思想和笛卡爾的研究上建樹卓越，但他最重要的影響是在倫理學方麵。威廉斯對功利主義和康德倫理學的批判，他對道德和道德要求的本質的探究，主導瞭近30年來西方倫理理論的思維，在某種意義上是這一時期最重要的道德哲學傢。

出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Bernard Williams

出品人:

頁數:188

译者:

出版時間:1982-1-29

價格:USD 48.00

裝幀:Paperback

isbn號碼:9780521286916

叢書系列:

圖書標籤:

道德哲學
倫理學
哲學
Bernard.Williams
Williams
BERNARD.WILLIAMS
哲學
譜係學

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A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers.

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這其實是Williams的一個學術文集，並且是內容也是消極的，即批評性的：Williams說不應該接受康德倫理學或功利主義那樣的普遍化的、抽象的道德體係。至於理由，Williams在下一本書《倫理學與哲學的限度》中纔提供：倫理學的核心問題應該是“我應該如何生活？”的問題，而不...

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《亞裏士多德學會會刊》於 1976 年刊發瞭威廉姆斯和托馬斯·內格爾同為《道德運氣》的兩篇文章,從而引發瞭西方倫理學領域對道德運氣的持續興趣。在《道德運氣》一文的開篇,威廉姆斯迴溯瞭傳統道德哲學的內在幸福觀,傳統哲學認為作為生活最終目的的幸福並非來自於不受自身控製的...

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Jack W. Meiland tries to defend ‘vulgar relativism’ which Bernard Williams criticizes and contrasts with his ‘appraisal relativism’ in his paper ‘The truth in relativism’. Meiland agrees that the distinction between genuine appraisal and notional appr...

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