Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today, the idea of "first-person authority" - the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life - has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In "Authority and Estrangement", Richard Moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person.Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being "objective" toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others.
發表於2024-11-04
Authority and Estrangement 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
圖書標籤: 心靈哲學 哲學 自我知識 分析哲學 英文 自我 分析 個人管理
對self-knowledge的探討,Moran完全否定瞭perceptual model of introspection,強調immediate/active/conscious的constitutive responsibility。Transparency and deliberative stance. 雖然Moran自己模棱兩可不錶明立場,不過很明顯是non-reductivist瞭。個人覺得最大的問題是Moran對the justification of belief略狹隘以及vague,需要對reason(rational agency)進行更多的討論// 時隔四年,再討論self knowledge時,發現自己受此書影響如此之大。 3/5/2019
評分對self-knowledge的探討,Moran完全否定瞭perceptual model of introspection,強調immediate/active/conscious的constitutive responsibility。Transparency and deliberative stance. 雖然Moran自己模棱兩可不錶明立場,不過很明顯是non-reductivist瞭。個人覺得最大的問題是Moran對the justification of belief略狹隘以及vague,需要對reason(rational agency)進行更多的討論// 時隔四年,再討論self knowledge時,發現自己受此書影響如此之大。 3/5/2019
評分對self-knowledge的探討,Moran完全否定瞭perceptual model of introspection,強調immediate/active/conscious的constitutive responsibility。Transparency and deliberative stance. 雖然Moran自己模棱兩可不錶明立場,不過很明顯是non-reductivist瞭。個人覺得最大的問題是Moran對the justification of belief略狹隘以及vague,需要對reason(rational agency)進行更多的討論// 時隔四年,再討論self knowledge時,發現自己受此書影響如此之大。 3/5/2019
評分對self-knowledge的探討,Moran完全否定瞭perceptual model of introspection,強調immediate/active/conscious的constitutive responsibility。Transparency and deliberative stance. 雖然Moran自己模棱兩可不錶明立場,不過很明顯是non-reductivist瞭。個人覺得最大的問題是Moran對the justification of belief略狹隘以及vague,需要對reason(rational agency)進行更多的討論// 時隔四年,再討論self knowledge時,發現自己受此書影響如此之大。 3/5/2019
評分對self-knowledge的探討,Moran完全否定瞭perceptual model of introspection,強調immediate/active/conscious的constitutive responsibility。Transparency and deliberative stance. 雖然Moran自己模棱兩可不錶明立場,不過很明顯是non-reductivist瞭。個人覺得最大的問題是Moran對the justification of belief略狹隘以及vague,需要對reason(rational agency)進行更多的討論// 時隔四年,再討論self knowledge時,發現自己受此書影響如此之大。 3/5/2019
Authority and Estrangement 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載