T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
發表於2024-05-18
Being Realistic about Reasons 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
本書是基於斯坎倫2009年在牛津的洛剋講座講稿修訂而成,薄薄一本,除開首尾非正文部分,隻有123頁,卻包含瞭當代倫理學的大量問題。從規範性問題、動機問題、認知主義-非認知主義,到形而上學和知識論,斯坎倫可謂信手拈來。除瞭他一貫簡潔和清晰的行文,有時讀起來感覺他已步...
評分本書是基於斯坎倫2009年在牛津的洛剋講座講稿修訂而成,薄薄一本,除開首尾非正文部分,隻有123頁,卻包含瞭當代倫理學的大量問題。從規範性問題、動機問題、認知主義-非認知主義,到形而上學和知識論,斯坎倫可謂信手拈來。除瞭他一貫簡潔和清晰的行文,有時讀起來感覺他已步...
評分本書是基於斯坎倫2009年在牛津的洛剋講座講稿修訂而成,薄薄一本,除開首尾非正文部分,隻有123頁,卻包含瞭當代倫理學的大量問題。從規範性問題、動機問題、認知主義-非認知主義,到形而上學和知識論,斯坎倫可謂信手拈來。除瞭他一貫簡潔和清晰的行文,有時讀起來感覺他已步...
評分本書是基於斯坎倫2009年在牛津的洛剋講座講稿修訂而成,薄薄一本,除開首尾非正文部分,隻有123頁,卻包含瞭當代倫理學的大量問題。從規範性問題、動機問題、認知主義-非認知主義,到形而上學和知識論,斯坎倫可謂信手拈來。除瞭他一貫簡潔和清晰的行文,有時讀起來感覺他已步...
評分本書是基於斯坎倫2009年在牛津的洛剋講座講稿修訂而成,薄薄一本,除開首尾非正文部分,隻有123頁,卻包含瞭當代倫理學的大量問題。從規範性問題、動機問題、認知主義-非認知主義,到形而上學和知識論,斯坎倫可謂信手拈來。除瞭他一貫簡潔和清晰的行文,有時讀起來感覺他已步...
圖書標籤: 哲學 ethics 倫理學 Philosophy 元倫理學 normative 實踐基礎 reason
一盤大棋,如何不用康德的方法談實踐理性和行動的規範性。
評分展開辯護一套理由基礎主義實在論,整齊規範得體、淺顯精煉全麵,還很updated,感覺特彆厲害這麼一個講稿(好似終於有人直接順著Putnam指齣的"epistemic values are also values"往下講瞭講(p. 35)
評分一盤大棋,如何不用康德的方法談實踐理性和行動的規範性。
評分1. 對規範性事實的本體論和規範性的認識論和確定性的討論尤其富有啓發性,從數學哲學那裏尋求的對於規範性事實的獨立性和確定性的支援雖然深刻但並不那麼令人信服。這一方麵還有繼續探討的巨大空間。 2. 對理由的強度的討論顯示齣作者的猶豫不決,這顯示齣前麵的討論並沒有很好的解決理由的規範性問題。實際上這是理由理論中最難啃的一塊。 3. 我懷疑很多文句的語法是錯誤的,無法弄明白句子成分的句子到處都是。有時,這使我的閱讀體驗十分糟糕。當然,這可能是因為我自己的語言能力不濟。
評分跟Korsgaard, Williams, Harman等人關於reason的對話非常精彩,對internal reason和external reason這個哲學僞命題的診斷也簡明。An effective defense of cognitivism in metaethics.
Being Realistic about Reasons 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載