This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.
發表於2024-12-22
Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
圖書標籤: 比較政治 政治學 威權主義 政治經濟學 英文原版 經濟,政治和曆史 民主 比較政治學
基本上是對精英分裂模型的一個總結和重述,很多細節值得斟酌。看完案例部分再展開講吧。
評分niubility,現在民主專製起源的分析很多都聚焦於精英的態度與策略(但又不同於轉型學)…書很好,但總覺得少瞭些什麼
評分基本上是對精英分裂模型的一個總結和重述,很多細節值得斟酌。看完案例部分再展開講吧。
評分niubility,現在民主專製起源的分析很多都聚焦於精英的態度與策略(但又不同於轉型學)…書很好,但總覺得少瞭些什麼
評分基本上是對精英分裂模型的一個總結和重述,很多細節值得斟酌。看完案例部分再展開講吧。
Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載