弗裏德裏剋·肖爾：美國弗吉尼亞大學法學院大衛與瑪麗·哈裏森講席傑齣教授 曾執教於密歇根大學法學院，1990年至2008年執教於哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院，任弗蘭剋·斯坦頓第一修正案講席教授，同時在哈怫大學法學院教授證據法與言論自由的課程。著有《淫穢活動的法律規製》(1976 )、《言論自由的哲學研究》(1982)、《依規則遊戲：對法律與生活中規則裁判的哲學考察》(1991)、《扼要、概率與陳規》(2003)、《像法律人那樣思考：法律推理新論》(2009)，編有《規則理論》(卡爾·盧埃林文集，2011)。

雷磊：中國政法大學法理學研究所副教授，德國基爾大學、海德堡大學訪問學者，著作：《法律體係、法律方法與法治》（2016）、《規範理論與法律論證》（2012）、《類比法律論證：以德國學說為齣發點》（2011），編著：《拉德布魯赫公式》（2015），編譯：《法：作為理性的製度化》（羅伯特·阿列剋西），譯作：《法律邏輯》（烏爾裏希·剋盧格）、《法律獲取的程序：一種理性分析》（阿圖爾·考夫曼）、《指令與規範》（阿爾夫·羅斯）、《為法學而鬥爭：法的定義》（2011）、《法理性商談——法哲學研究》（羅伯特·阿列剋西）。

This primer on legal reasoning is aimed at law students and upper-level undergraduates. But it is also an original exposition of basic legal concepts that scholars and lawyers will find stimulating. It covers such topics as rules, precedent, authority, analogical reasoning, the common law, statutory interpretation, legal realism, judicial opinions, legal facts, and burden of proof. In addressing the question whether legal reasoning is distinctive, Frederick Schauer emphasizes the formality and rule-dependence of law. When taking the words of a statute seriously, when following a rule even when it does not produce the best result, when treating the fact of a past decision as a reason for making the same decision again, or when relying on authoritative sources, the law embodies values other than simply that of making the best decision for the particular occasion or dispute. In thus pursuing goals of stability, predictability, and constraint on the idiosyncrasies of individual decision-makers, the law employs forms of reasoning that may not be unique to it but are far more dominant in legal decision-making than elsewhere. Schauer’s analysis of what makes legal reasoning special will be a valuable guide for students while also presenting a challenge to a wide range of current academic theories.