“Minds without Meanings is a very small book that attempts to do the very ambitious job of solving the problem of content. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue that the only semantic notion worth scientific attention is reference. Then they give an empirically grounded theory of reference. The book is vintage Fodor and Pylyshyn—densely argued, funny, infuriating. Great fun and a must-read.”
—Anthony Chemero, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati; author of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
“Meaning (word or lexical meaning) has eluded computationalists, is taken for granted by most cognitive psychologists, and has been pursued mightily by philosophers, mostly with results that are either mysterian or simplistic. So when two of the most influential collaborators in cognitive science, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, mount an impressive argument that most of what researchers starting with Frege have had in mind by meaning does not exist, the community will take notice. Even if the conclusion is very implausible.”
—Andrew Brook, Chancellor's Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science; former President, Canadian Philosophical Association, Carleton University
“Cognitive science is long overdue for a fundamental overhaul of its basic assumptions. It must do away with meanings, intensions, and Fregean senses, in any and all varieties. To have a future, representational cognitive science must naturalistically explain how reference, and reference alone, can ground a purely extensional theory of mental content. Such is this book’s challenging assessment. Getting to the true heart of the issues, packed with philosophical arguments and empirical analyses and full of wit, the book directs cognitive science down an exciting new path. Whether it can survive the journey remains to be seen.”
—Daniel D. Hutto, Professor of Philosophical Psychology, University of Wollongong and University of Hertfordshire; coauthor of Radicalizing Enactivism and author of Folk Psychological Narratives
“In these revelatory new essays, Fodor and Pylyshyn, finding the problem of ‘meaning’ unsolvable, propose to do away with it altogether in favor of an enriched view of reference that can link concepts directly to the world.”
—Lila Gleitman, Professor of Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania
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