Cover 1
Title 6
Copyright 7
Contents 10
Preface 14
Acknowledgements 16
Agenda 18
Chapter 1. Noncooperative Games 26
§1.1. Crossroads: a motorist's dilemma 26
§1.2. The Hawk-Dove game 31
§1.3. Rational reaction sets and Nash equilibria 33
§1.4. Four Ways: a motorist's trilemma 43
§1.5. Store Wars: a continuous game of prices 49
§1.6. Store Wars II: a three-player game 59
§1.7. Max-min strategies 68
§1.8. Commentary 70
Exercises 1 71
Chapter 2. Evolutionary Stability and Other Selection Criteria 76
§2.1. Harsanyi and Selten's criterion 76
§2.2. Kalai and Samet's criterion 80
§2.3. Maynard Smith's criterion 82
§2.4. Crossroads as a continuous population game 91
§2.5. An example of population dynamics 97
§2.6. Discrete population games. Multiple ESSes 99
§2.7. Asymmetry of role: Owners and Intruders 105
§2.8. Spiders in a spin—a case of anti-Bourgeois? 117
§2.9. Commentary 119
Exercises 2 121
Chapter 3. Cooperative Games in Strategic Form 126
§3.1. Unimprovability: group rationality 127
§3.2. Necessary conditions for unimprovability 134
§3.3. The Nash bargaining solution 140
§3.4. Independent versus correlated strategies 145
§3.5. Commentary 149
Exercises 3 149
Chapter 4. Characteristic Function Games 152
§4.1. Characteristic functions and reasonable sets 153
§4.2. Core-related concepts 160
§4.3. A four-person car pool 165
§4.4. Log hauling: a coreless game 169
§4.5. Antique dealing. The nucleolus 172
§4.6. Team long-jumping. An improper game 182
§4.7. The Shapley value 185
§4.8. Simple games. The Shapley-Shubik index 190
§4.9. Commentary 192
Exercises 4 192
Chapter 5. Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma 198
§5.1. A laboratory prisoner's dilemma 200
§5.2. A game of foraging among oviposition sites 203
§5.3. Tit for tat: champion reciprocative strategy 207
§5.4. Other reciprocative strategies 211
§5.5. Dynamic versus static interaction 225
§5.6. Stability of a nice population: static case 230
§5.7. Stability of a nice population: dynamic case 232
§5.8. Mutualism: common ends or enemies 236
§5.9. Much ado about scorekeeping 241
§5.10. The comedy of errors 243
§5.11. Commentary 246
Exercises 5 250
Chapter 6. More Population Games 254
§6.1. Sex allocation: a game with a weak ESS 255
§6.2. Damselfly duels: a war of attrition 256
§6.3. Games among kin versus games between kin 265
§6.4. Information and strategy: a mating game 270
§6.5. Roving ravens: a recruitment game 276
§6.6. Cooperative wildlife management 286
§6.7. Winner and loser effect 296
§6.8. Stomatopod strife: a threat game 311
§6.9. Commentary 323
Exercises 6 327
Chapter 7. Appraisal 332
Appendix A. The Tracing Procedure 340
Appendix B. Solutions to Selected Exercises 344
Bibliography 372
Index 388
A 388
B 388
C 388
D 389
E 389
F 390
G 390
H 390
I 390
J 391
K 391
L 391
M 391
N 391
O 391
P 391
R 392
S 392
T 393
U 393
V 393
W 393
Z 393
Back Cover 394
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