Thomas B. Pepinsky is Assistant Professor of Government and a faculty affiliate of the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University, New York. His research appears in World Politics, the European Journal of International Relations, the Journal of East Asian Studies, the Journal of Democracy, Studies in Comparative International Development, and several edited volumes. He received his PhD from Yale University and taught at the University of Colorado, Boulder from 2007 to 2008. He held a Fulbright–Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship in Indonesia and Malaysia from 2004 to 2005.
Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.
發表於2024-12-22
Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
圖書標籤: 比較政治 比較政治經濟學 政治學 威權主義 民主轉型 經濟危機 政治經濟學 威權國傢轉型
非常清晰的一本書,關注瞭利益集團是怎樣通過社會集團影響政策製定,同時對經濟危機時期威權政府為何崩潰做齣瞭閤理的解釋。非常值得在這本書既有模型的基礎上進一步挖掘。
評分其實是摩爾的延伸版。總的來說不錯,一個簡單有力的解釋,隻要能把摩爾的模式發揮好 ,社會集團這個變量總有很強的解釋力,但摩爾的優勢也是其劣勢,單變量,單維度的解釋會忽略很多東西,因此,需要加入斯考切波的bring the state back的維度,政府是有能力塑造認同及其集團的,尤其碰到一個強有力的威權統治者的時候,因此,在其他條件相同的情況下,一個因素的不同往往會導緻相差極大的結果
評分其實是摩爾的延伸版。總的來說不錯,一個簡單有力的解釋,隻要能把摩爾的模式發揮好 ,社會集團這個變量總有很強的解釋力,但摩爾的優勢也是其劣勢,單變量,單維度的解釋會忽略很多東西,因此,需要加入斯考切波的bring the state back的維度,政府是有能力塑造認同及其集團的,尤其碰到一個強有力的威權統治者的時候,因此,在其他條件相同的情況下,一個因素的不同往往會導緻相差極大的結果
評分其實是摩爾的延伸版。總的來說不錯,一個簡單有力的解釋,隻要能把摩爾的模式發揮好 ,社會集團這個變量總有很強的解釋力,但摩爾的優勢也是其劣勢,單變量,單維度的解釋會忽略很多東西,因此,需要加入斯考切波的bring the state back的維度,政府是有能力塑造認同及其集團的,尤其碰到一個強有力的威權統治者的時候,因此,在其他條件相同的情況下,一個因素的不同往往會導緻相差極大的結果
評分非常清晰的一本書,關注瞭利益集團是怎樣通過社會集團影響政策製定,同時對經濟危機時期威權政府為何崩潰做齣瞭閤理的解釋。非常值得在這本書既有模型的基礎上進一步挖掘。
Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載