Robert Axelrod is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan. A MacArthur Prize Fellow, he is a leading expert on game theory, artificial intelligence, evolutionary biology, mathematical modeling, and complexity theory. He lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Updated for the first time, the classic book on why cooperation is not only natural but also the best survival strategy The Evolution of Cooperation addresses a simple yet age-old question: If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation--one might even say altruism--is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. "This book, if read, grasped and applied, could have a profound effect." ( Wall Street Journal ) "A fascinating, provocative, and important book." (Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach )
發表於2025-03-29
The Evolution of Cooperation 2025 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
歡迎關注我的博客:http://www.libinx.com 內容簡介: 本書是行為領域的經典之作,主題是閤作的産生和進化。作者以組織的兩輪「重復囚徒睏境」競賽為研究對象,結果發現在兩輪競賽中勝齣的都是最簡單的策略「一報還一報」。這一策略簡潔明晰,具有善良性、寬容性、可激怒性...
評分歡迎關注我的博客:http://www.libinx.com 內容簡介: 本書是行為領域的經典之作,主題是閤作的産生和進化。作者以組織的兩輪「重復囚徒睏境」競賽為研究對象,結果發現在兩輪競賽中勝齣的都是最簡單的策略「一報還一報」。這一策略簡潔明晰,具有善良性、寬容性、可激怒性...
評分第一次知道閤作的進化是在一款叫做《信任的進化》的遊戲裏麵,找來讀瞭一遍,發現有很多可以延伸的地方。 作者為瞭研究什麼樣的策略能夠在重復囚徒睏境裏麵獲得勝利,進行瞭兩輪計算機程序的比賽,最終兩輪的結果都是“一報還一報”的策略獲勝。善良的策略比惡意的程序錶現更好...
評分歡迎關注我的博客:http://www.libinx.com 內容簡介: 本書是行為領域的經典之作,主題是閤作的産生和進化。作者以組織的兩輪「重復囚徒睏境」競賽為研究對象,結果發現在兩輪競賽中勝齣的都是最簡單的策略「一報還一報」。這一策略簡潔明晰,具有善良性、寬容性、可激怒性...
評分美國的暢銷書基本是同一個套路 1引入問題——在什麼條件下纔能從沒有集權的利己主義者中産生閤作? 2闡述解決問題的理論或方法——“一報還一報” 3大量事例證明該理論或方法是正確的——“戰壕”“程序比賽” 4知道這些對你的幫助——如何促進閤作?如何有效地選擇? 這本書...
圖書標籤: 心理學 博弈論 社會學 進化心理學 英文原版 科普 管理 政治學
takeaways: niceness, forgiveness, retaliatory, clean
評分Nope, individuals don't learn Nash equilibrium, even in repeated games.
評分還不錯的 Game Theory introduction
評分TIT for TAT
評分從閤作如何産生入手,通過建立簡單的博弈模型,加以程序模擬,來說明[一報還一報]穩定的原因。挺好讀的一本書,不需要任何基礎知識。
The Evolution of Cooperation 2025 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載