Governing the Commons

出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Elinor Ostrom

页数:298

出版时间:1990-11-30

价格:USD 29.00

装帧:Paperback

isbn号码:9780521405997

具体描述

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

作者简介

Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]

Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]

读后感

本書的作者是公共經濟學與公共選擇學派的創始人之一，埃莉諾・奧斯特羅姆（Elinor Ostrom）。副標題叫做“集體行動制度的演進”.在我看來，其副標題，簡明扼要點出全書的核心。 開頭要說一說關於翻譯的事情，我不確定原書當中如何遣詞造句，但此書翻譯的水準讓我來說到底有...  

第一次上导师的课，老师就讲了如何读书的问题，听后深感惋惜，要是早听四年的话，估计我的本科生涯不会那么混乱，当然这也与我的性格有关，不过总不至于那么混乱。老师说读书应该按照由近及远、由专到通、强调专业和兴趣，并要求书籍与文章兼顾，因为后来出现的书一般都会...  

奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例，向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法，并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析，包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明，个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此，以往认为的解...  

《公共事物的治理之道》✋ 来个记录:刚开始读这本书有点困难，翻译蹩脚，看到中间才渐入佳境。这位女士精彩地通过案例分析（选了些小范围的公共池塘资源）建构出整个制度变迁的框架，了解公共池塘资源的哪些内外部变量起了促进作用或阻碍作用。书中介绍了三个传统分析公共物...  

经济运行的基本模型即市场机制，市场作为“看不见的手”，以价格为信号引导着人们追求自我利益最大化，而很多时候，也“无心插柳”地促进了社会的公共利益。但是，面对垄断、外部性、信息不完全和公共物品领域等，市场存在着失灵的现象，这时便需要引入政府管制对模型进...  

用户评价

作者实在是太considerate了，每一个道理都讲得相当透彻，经常是我刚刚写下心得就发现下一句正是我写的心得的意思...

"前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定，国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义，故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排，奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源，提出社区产权的第三条路。" 引自熊猫。只读了第一三六章的Chris

还要看其它书，只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同：奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型，奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法，提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量，再以机制加以串联，成为分析框架，用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论；奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开，奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品，在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品，两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞，这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题；前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定，国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义，故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排，奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源，提出社区产权的第三条路。

"前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定，国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义，故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排，奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源，提出社区产权的第三条路。" 引自熊猫。只读了第一三六章的Chris

不分主次啰嗦至极！！！！