The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
中國的環境麵臨著從所未有的壓力,空氣、水和垃圾的問題是環保組織最關心的。就我的觀察而言,目前環保組織的爭取重點在政府信息的公開與民間組織的的介入,即在外部監督上做文章。 本身不是政治學的科班齣身,齣於工作的需要和個人的興趣而閱讀這本書,對埃莉諾的思想源流等...
評分 評分最近想結閤自己的行業寫點東西,但讀的書少,讀政治經濟學得東西更少。來這裏嚮各位書友請教。先嚮各位道聲謝謝! 産品的供給,一種模式是政府嚴格管理,提高標準,人為造成産品高端化,從而導緻産品供給的不足,同時政府需要承擔不達標産品的監督與檢查及欺騙行為。如目前國...
評分比較經典的一本書,對於徘徊在利維坦與私有化之外的廣泛的社會自組織進行瞭研究。實質上而言,是關於人類集體行動邏輯的一次深刻發覺,發人深省。對於全球範圍內的典型個案做瞭對比性分析。本書推理齣的自組織與自主治理的八大特徵有非常重要的指導意義。
評分〇、寫在前麵: 這本書我隻讀瞭一遍,有些地方也不盡其然;對於全書的把握並非完全正確和深入,所以以下所有部分為個人觀點,保留版權,切勿隨意轉載使用,僅供參考。 一、一些名詞解釋: 分權製企業:個人覺得這個“企業”翻譯成組織或者結構就容易理解瞭,比如在修建水渠的...
針對公地問題私有化&政府管製外的第三條道路,非常有啓發性!(作者是第一位女性諾貝爾經濟學奬獲得者,🐂🍺
评分看過較久,有些內容記不清瞭。大體記得是從“公用地悲劇”和博弈論齣發解讀collective action的一本書,中間列舉豐富例證證明信息互動、共享價值觀、外在監督的作用。最後的結論把作者的觀點梳理得很清晰。作者自己是很有名的instistutionalism研究者,這本書寫得也很透徹易懂(至少比起D.C.North是這樣,斜眼)。
评分classic. 為瞭thesis讀的書,相見恨晚獲益匪淺。雖然理論的實踐總是麵對諸多睏難,但至少提供瞭一種可探索的模式。個人對廣泛適用的簡單模型不是很感冒,因為通常模型越簡單,現實越打臉,所以這種多方考量商量著來留齣餘地的討論反而比較閤我胃口。
评分"前代理論假定博弈結構的外在限製恒定,國傢市場等機製皆有過分簡化的定義,故解決方法不是外來權力就是産權安排,奧女士則著重考察小型社區情境中個人如何在互動中設定和改變博弈規則、分配公用資源,提齣社區産權的第三條路。" 引自熊貓。隻讀瞭第一三六章的Chris
评分經典論著
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