Yuhua Wang (王裕华) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).
发表于2024-11-04
Tying the Autocrat's Hands 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书
图书标签: 政治学 中国政治 海外中国研究 威权主义 法治 法学 比较政治 王玉华
Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.
4.5星。和其他很多读者不同,我很喜欢这本书。第一,提出的问题很重要,有的威权国家为什么会有动力推动依法治国是一个很好的研究题目。作者的回答也有广泛的可应用性,其理论核心虽然简单但很有力。本书的核心论点是更依赖于FDI的地方政府更可能会推动法治,因为外资需要公正透明的法治来维护其投资利益。相反,当地的企业可以通过私人关系和腐败来维护自身利益。第二,数据分析虽然不见得尽善尽美,但我没发现什么大错,而且给定作者的数据,我不认为自己会做得比作者更好。第三,丰富的、有意思的一手访谈,里面有许多有趣的东西(比如有个“保护牌”的图),也足见作者真的是中国法治问题的专家。总起来看,本书算是我读过的最优秀(之一)的基于中国案例的比较政治学著作了。
评分每章开头引一句卡夫卡,玩得6
评分读完Introduction,可以转战该系列其他书了。
评分很有意思的一个 argument,认为 Authoritarian ruler 之所以愿意进行 partial rule of law 取决于财产所有者中 political connection 不强的那批。在中国语境下,就是外资企业因为政治 connection 的相对不利因而更要求一个公平的市场环境。因而依赖外资税收较多的政府则会更倾向于提供这样的环境;但是如果政府主要依赖本地企业和国有企业税收,其在这方面的 committment 就不会那么强。
评分一些结论:外资企业由于没有政治资本、受企业机制不会贿赂,普遍认为自身产权没有受到保护,转而寻求法治途径、走诉讼而非调解或仲裁。对比之下港澳台资本因有人际网络而无意推动法治,中国经济改革是外资vs中资而非公有vs私有。政府为FDI经济利益相应建设法制,但仅限于经济纠纷而非民事/政治纠纷。法院行政结构、经费来源、人员晋升直接说受控于政府,后者又看重经济发展和社会稳定,所以法庭直接成了维持绩效的工具。作者为了出书时常一段话在前中后反复说三五遍让我很困扰,而且这种以定量方法为主导的铁板一块的研究显然太无趣、结论太大一统了,让我怀疑定性访谈的其他自变量都不见了,每章开头引一段卡夫卡的城堡很文艺,不过总体而言我对法治需求侧理论不感兴趣,顺道八卦了他统计学家老婆Boyang Chai~ Chris
Tying the Autocrat's Hands 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书