Tying the Autocrat's Hands

Yuhua Wang (王裕华) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).

出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Wang Yuhua

页数:216

出版时间:2014-12-18

价格:USD 90.00

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9781107071742

丛书系列:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

图书标签:政治学中国政治海外中国研究威权主义法治法学比较政治王玉华

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Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.

用户评价

法治的需求侧理论，外资企业由于无法政治寻租而要求更公平的市场环境，因此对法治需求高。政府因为需要经济发展而愿意在经济领域自缚手脚。作者理论功底和实证分析同样精彩，政治及其腐败对于法治的影响提现了既得利益者对于国家权力的攫取和贪恋。要说有何不足，作者可以更精细处理几次司改的命运，并更清晰地分析法治在政治经济领域的不均衡可能带来的危机。

法治的需求侧理论，外资企业由于无法政治寻租而要求更公平的市场环境，因此对法治需求高。政府因为需要经济发展而愿意在经济领域自缚手脚。作者理论功底和实证分析同样精彩，政治及其腐败对于法治的影响提现了既得利益者对于国家权力的攫取和贪恋。要说有何不足，作者可以更精细处理几次司改的命运，并更清晰地分析法治在政治经济领域的不均衡可能带来的危机。

一些结论：外资企业由于没有政治资本、受企业机制不会贿赂，普遍认为自身产权没有受到保护，转而寻求法治途径、走诉讼而非调解或仲裁。对比之下港澳台资本因有人际网络而无意推动法治，中国经济改革是外资vs中资而非公有vs私有。政府为FDI经济利益相应建设法制，但仅限于经济纠纷而非民事/政治纠纷。法院行政结构、经费来源、人员晋升直接说受控于政府，后者又看重经济发展和社会稳定，所以法庭直接成了维持绩效的工具。作者为了出书时常一段话在前中后反复说三五遍让我很困扰，而且这种以定量方法为主导的铁板一块的研究显然太无趣、结论太大一统了，让我怀疑定性访谈的其他自变量都不见了，每章开头引一段卡夫卡的城堡很文艺，不过总体而言我对法治需求侧理论不感兴趣，顺道八卦了他统计学家老婆Boyang Chai~ Chris

略失望，为何政治学还钟情现代化理论（作为靶子），因为inference的限制不能讲更精细的故事了吗？

看的时候，难免会对比第一次看作者的dissertation的感受. 然后第一反应竟然是太太/先生是统计相关专业的重要性，至少对于提高配图质量是高度显著的......