Tying the Autocrat's Hands

Yuhua Wang (王裕华) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).

出版者:Cambridge University Press

作者:Wang Yuhua

页数:216

出版时间:2014-12-18

价格:USD 90.00

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9781107071742

丛书系列:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

图书标签:政治学中国政治海外中国研究威权主义法治法学比较政治王玉华

Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.

用户评价

读完Introduction，可以转战该系列其他书了。

每章开头引一句卡夫卡，玩得6

略失望，为何政治学还钟情现代化理论（作为靶子），因为inference的限制不能讲更精细的故事了吗？

加一星给卡夫卡 难得（也难看）的是作者作为一个北大背景的学者居然提供了这么一个头脑简单的答案

未达到预期。单看标题便能知核心论点的关键——外资进入推动中国经济领域的法治，但政治体制决定了政府不会允许政治上的防治。观点似乎不新鲜，且对于法治的探讨不够深入。被看重的或许更多的是多方法和数据处理的擅长吧。