Being Realistic about Reasons

T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).

出版者:Oxford University Press

作者:T. M. Scanlon

页数:144

出版时间:2014-3-15

价格:USD 29.95

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9780199678488

图书标签:哲学ethics伦理学Philosophy元伦理学normative实践基础reason

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T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

读后感

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

用户评价

看了第一部分，很cheap但也确实有效的消解形而上学方案，和近年兴起的easy ontology旨趣相同。

一本非常可敬的小册子，斯坎伦在一系列metaethics问题跟其他大家（尤其Williams、Korsgaard、Harman）的对话不可不谓精彩——虽然我依旧不能赞同Scanlon的这种（reason） realism。

看了第一部分，很cheap但也确实有效的消解形而上学方案，和近年兴起的easy ontology旨趣相同。

一盘大棋，如何不用康德的方法谈实践理性和行动的规范性。

一盘大棋，如何不用康德的方法谈实践理性和行动的规范性。