Being Realistic about Reasons 2025 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).

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发表于2025-01-27

Being Realistic about Reasons 2025 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

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出版者:Oxford University Press

作者:T. M. Scanlon

出品人:

页数:144

译者:

出版时间:2014-3-15

价格:USD 29.95

装帧:Hardcover

isbn号码:9780199678488

丛书系列:

图书标签: 哲学 ethics 伦理学 Philosophy 元伦理学 normative 实践基础 reason

Being Realistic about Reasons 2025 pdf epub mobi 电子书图书描述

T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

Being Realistic about Reasons 2025 pdf epub mobi 电子书

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小册子，但既不简约也不简单，论证密度极大，没有大家小书常见的凝练晓畅感，因为不避枝蔓，在理由基础主义的形而上学疑难、实践重要性说明、认识论问题以及理由的强度和可选择性特征说明这一主线下对欲望理论、康德式建构主义、表达主义，威廉斯、考思佳、吉巴德等各路主张作了回应，也因此，不少子题分散在全书中，有时觉得挺乱。虽然立场鲜明，对其他理论路线也作了全面但简略的回应，但要说多透彻、多有说服力也不见得，不如说是对各种理论路线作了更精确的澄清，挑明了彼此分歧究竟在哪，在七个得分点（p. 3）上各自得失几何。而所谓realistic，似乎指自己的理由认知主义立场不强求某种追根究底、十足可靠的说明，很温和、很有界限感，贴近常识实实在在（p. 2，p.123）。

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展开辩护一套理由基础主义实在论，整齐规范得体、浅显精炼全面，还很updated，感觉特别厉害这么一个讲稿（好似终于有人直接顺着Putnam指出的"epistemic values are also values"往下讲了讲（p. 35）

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跟Korsgaard, Williams, Harman等人关于reason的对话非常精彩，对internal reason和external reason这个哲学伪命题的诊断也简明。An effective defense of cognitivism in metaethics.

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Being Realistic about Reasons 2025 pdf epub mobi 电子书