T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).
发表于2024-12-26
Being Realistic about Reasons 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书
本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成,薄薄一本,除开首尾非正文部分,只有123页,却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义,到形而上学和知识论,斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文,有时读起来感觉他已步...
评分本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成,薄薄一本,除开首尾非正文部分,只有123页,却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义,到形而上学和知识论,斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文,有时读起来感觉他已步...
评分本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成,薄薄一本,除开首尾非正文部分,只有123页,却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义,到形而上学和知识论,斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文,有时读起来感觉他已步...
评分本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成,薄薄一本,除开首尾非正文部分,只有123页,却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义,到形而上学和知识论,斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文,有时读起来感觉他已步...
评分本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成,薄薄一本,除开首尾非正文部分,只有123页,却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义,到形而上学和知识论,斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文,有时读起来感觉他已步...
图书标签: 哲学 ethics 伦理学 Philosophy 元伦理学 normative 实践基础 reason
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
reasons fundamentalism
评分reasons fundamentalism
评分一盘大棋,如何不用康德的方法谈实践理性和行动的规范性。
评分1. 对规范性事实的本体论和规范性的认识论和确定性的讨论尤其富有启发性,从数学哲学那里寻求的对于规范性事实的独立性和确定性的支援虽然深刻但并不那么令人信服。这一方面还有继续探讨的巨大空间。 2. 对理由的强度的讨论显示出作者的犹豫不决,这显示出前面的讨论并没有很好的解决理由的规范性问题。实际上这是理由理论中最难啃的一块。 3. 我怀疑很多文句的语法是错误的,无法弄明白句子成分的句子到处都是。有时,这使我的阅读体验十分糟糕。当然,这可能是因为我自己的语言能力不济。
评分想翻译
Being Realistic about Reasons 2024 pdf epub mobi 电子书