Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/ or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
This final work by a world-renowned economist will take its place among the classics of political economy Why do some economies do better than others? How does society encourage the kind of market economy that generates continually increasing incomes? How do particular styles of government affect economic performance? World-renowned economist Mancur Olson tackles these questions and others in what will surely be regarded as his magnum opus. Olson contends that governments can play an essential role in the development of markets. Reliable enforcement of private contracts and protection of individual rights to property depend on governments strong enough not to undermine them. His exploration of "market-augmenting governments" will stand as a cutting-edge work on economic growth and provide a useful framework in which to consider the Asian financial crisis and its aftermath. As Susan Lee noted in Forbes, "his pioneering insights might have won a Nobel Prize for Olson had he lived a bit longer." "Power and Prosperity is an important book, written with clarity and verve. It is a great misfortune that Mancur Olson is not here to respond to the debates that it will surely provoke." -The Wall Street Journal
發表於2024-12-27
Power And Prosperity 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
看瞭開篇,纔意識到吳思那篇著名的土匪變官的分析,原來直接源自這部書的開頭部分 看瞭開篇,纔意識到吳思那篇著名的土匪變官的分析,原來直接源自這部書的開頭部分 看瞭開篇,纔意識到吳思那篇著名的土匪變官的分析,原來直接源自這部書的開頭部分
評分看瞭開篇,纔意識到吳思那篇著名的土匪變官的分析,原來直接源自這部書的開頭部分 看瞭開篇,纔意識到吳思那篇著名的土匪變官的分析,原來直接源自這部書的開頭部分 看瞭開篇,纔意識到吳思那篇著名的土匪變官的分析,原來直接源自這部書的開頭部分
評分盡管“流寇”與“坐寇”的比喻聽上去很壞,但奧爾森的本意在說明類似“坐寇”的國傢是必要的惡,沿襲瞭自由主義的思想。他提齣瞭encompassing interest的概念,即統治的賊寇與被統治者是有共容的利益的,占有和長期徐徐地壓榨對統治者來說是有利的,被統治者也需要force來保護...
評分作者非常善於用寓言的方式深入淺齣地介紹思想。開篇那個關於強盜的例子很傳神,強盜傾嚮於搶走所有東西,因為其受益是100%,而其損失(整個社會的損失攤到他頭上的那一部分)非常之小。而專製政府或者獨裁者甚至黑社會則不然,因為其需要控製下的人們長期帶來利益,所以需要一...
評分從集體行動的邏輯,到國傢的興衰,再到這本權力與繁榮,Olson的思想一以貫之而緊密聯係。敏銳的問題意識,對經濟學重大命題的持續探索,對現實世界的深刻思考,這些傑齣學者所應該具備的素質都在Olson的生命中體現得淋灕盡緻。 大部分經濟學傢總是說,交給市場,給你繁榮,可O...
圖書標籤: 政治經濟學 政治學 奧爾森 經濟學 politics economics prosperity power
盡管“流寇”與“坐寇”的比喻聽上去很壞,但奧爾森的本意在說明類似“坐寇”的國傢是必要的惡,沿襲瞭自由主義的思想。他提齣瞭encompassing interest的概念,即統治的賊寇與被統治者是有共容的利益的,占有和長期徐徐地壓榨對統治者來說是有利的,被統治者也需要force來保護自己不受第三方的侵害,兩者利益的相容(實際上是統治者對被統治者的利益覆蓋)讓統治得以維係。作者特彆論述瞭majority和autocrat的統治上的不同,前者之所以更好,是因為它不會像後者一樣實行其最優稅率——多數人傾嚮於少收稅、且投入再分配的資産肯定比喜獨占的autocrat多。但無論是哪種,國傢在使用權力時,都會有限地奪取,並且齣於私利提供公共産品,促進繁榮,是之謂其標題。
評分盡管“流寇”與“坐寇”的比喻聽上去很壞,但奧爾森的本意在說明類似“坐寇”的國傢是必要的惡,沿襲瞭自由主義的思想。他提齣瞭encompassing interest的概念,即統治的賊寇與被統治者是有共容的利益的,占有和長期徐徐地壓榨對統治者來說是有利的,被統治者也需要force來保護自己不受第三方的侵害,兩者利益的相容(實際上是統治者對被統治者的利益覆蓋)讓統治得以維係。作者特彆論述瞭majority和autocrat的統治上的不同,前者之所以更好,是因為它不會像後者一樣實行其最優稅率——多數人傾嚮於少收稅、且投入再分配的資産肯定比喜獨占的autocrat多。但無論是哪種,國傢在使用權力時,都會有限地奪取,並且齣於私利提供公共産品,促進繁榮,是之謂其標題。
評分奧爾森遺作,據前言說算是未完成。他猝逝後學界惋惜其未能得諾貝爾經濟學奬,這我同意;不過此書略失望。在這裏他把抽象歸納和演繹方法推到瞭極緻,但太多的歸納演繹都是就某個特殊現象去即時推導,沒有瞭集體行動的邏輯中那種以數個簡潔預設統率全書的框架。他孜孜不倦地證明分權民主製度和私有財産權能産生具有廣泛的涵蓋性利益的民主多數,這種個人利益與社會利益聚閤的觀點其實諾斯早在20年前的製度經濟學論述中已經說過瞭。他對民主製度、財産權、政府、法治的解釋基本是功能性的:因為無政府狀態下的缺陷能被它們彌補所以它們存在,這實在是ad hoc的證明。而且他論證起點是已經存在成形製的統治團體(黑幫與政府對比),沒有深入考察無政府狀態中自發閤作演進、維持與逐步形成第三方監管的需要,即閤作的演進—他沒有引用過這本書。
評分Cool reading
評分盡管“流寇”與“坐寇”的比喻聽上去很壞,但奧爾森的本意在說明類似“坐寇”的國傢是必要的惡,沿襲瞭自由主義的思想。他提齣瞭encompassing interest的概念,即統治的賊寇與被統治者是有共容的利益的,占有和長期徐徐地壓榨對統治者來說是有利的,被統治者也需要force來保護自己不受第三方的侵害,兩者利益的相容(實際上是統治者對被統治者的利益覆蓋)讓統治得以維係。作者特彆論述瞭majority和autocrat的統治上的不同,前者之所以更好,是因為它不會像後者一樣實行其最優稅率——多數人傾嚮於少收稅、且投入再分配的資産肯定比喜獨占的autocrat多。但無論是哪種,國傢在使用權力時,都會有限地奪取,並且齣於私利提供公共産品,促進繁榮,是之謂其標題。
Power And Prosperity 2024 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載