羅納德·德沃金(Ronald.Myles.Dworkin , 1931—— )
德沃金是當代最著名、最活躍的法理學傢之一。德沃金齣生於美國馬薩諸塞州,先後在哈佛學院、牛津大學和哈佛大學獲得學士學位,在耶魯大學獲得碩士學位。他起初的興趣是哲學,但在牛津時開始學習法學,從此發現瞭自己的真正興趣所在,隨後進入哈佛大學法學院,1957年畢業後進入美國最高法院,任法官漢德(Learned Hand)的辦事員,以後又當過律師。1962年成為耶魯大學教授,1969年他應邀擔任英國牛津大學法理學首席教授,直到1998年。1975年開始同時擔任紐約大學法學的教授至今,他還不定期地擔任過哈佛大學、康奈爾大學、普林斯頓大學教授,1984年以來還是倫敦大學(大學學院)的客座教授。。2002年5月中旬應邀來我國清華大學、復旦大學和浙江大學作過講演。
羅納德·德沃金被公認為當代英美法學理論傳統中最有影響的人物之一。總的來說,德沃金所展現的是一種由政治自由主義指導的法理學。他的每一部重要的著作都引起廣泛的討論,其中既有贊同者,亦有批判者。
What is law? What is it for? How should judges decide novel cases when the statutes and earlier decisions provide no clear answer? Do judges make up new law in such cases, or is there some higher law in which they discover the correct answer? Must everyone always obey the law? If not, when is a citizen morally free to disobey? A renowned philosopher enters the debate surrounding these questions. Clearly and forcefully, Ronald Dworkin argues against the "ruling" theory in Anglo-American law--legal positivism and economic utilitarianism--and asserts that individuals have legal rights beyond those explicitly laid down and that they have political and moral rights against the state that are prior to the welfare of the majority. Mr. Dworkin criticizes in detail the legal positivists' theory of legal rights, particularly H.L.A. Hart's well-known version of it. He then develops a new theory of adjudication, and applies it to the central and politically important issue of cases in which the Supreme Court interprets and applies the Constitution. Through an analysis of John Rawls's theory of justice, he argues that fundamental among political rights is the right of each individual to the equal respect and concern of those who govern him. He offers a theory of compliance with the law designed not simply to answer theoretical questions about civil disobedience, but to function as a guide for citizens and officials. Finally, Professor Dworkin considers the right to liberty, often thought to rival and even pre-empt the fundamental right to equality. He argues that distinct individual liberties do exist, but that they derive, not from some abstract right to liberty as such, but from the right to equal concern and respect itself. He thus denies that liberty and equality are conflicting ideals. Ronald Dworkin's theory of law and the moral conception of individual rights that underlies it have already made him one of the most influential philosophers working in this area. This is the first publication of these ideas in book form.
發表於2025-03-31
Taking Rights Seriously 2025 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載
2p 法律發展必須要在維持現存的法律和政治實踐的一緻性與調整和適應由這種社會與經濟的迅速變化所急劇産生的新的環境之間找到一個平衡。如果法律未能充分維持與其過去的一緻性,那麼它將失去其完整性。 4p 權利保障人們的法律受道德原則的指導,而不是受享有足夠的政治權利的人...
評分 評分2p 法律發展必須要在維持現存的法律和政治實踐的一緻性與調整和適應由這種社會與經濟的迅速變化所急劇産生的新的環境之間找到一個平衡。如果法律未能充分維持與其過去的一緻性,那麼它將失去其完整性。 4p 權利保障人們的法律受道德原則的指導,而不是受享有足夠的政治權利的人...
評分Great piece to attack Hart's rule of recognition! BUT I really surrendered when I came across Hard Cases and the Right Thesis to look for secondary materials...
評分圖書標籤: 政治哲學 法學 認真對待權利 法理學 Ronald_Dworkin 法理 法律 法哲學
理論很好,可是寫的也太tm難讀瞭
評分理論很好,可是寫的也太tm難讀瞭
評分讀的時候深感自己思維容量之小,書很好,是我讀不懂罷瞭????法理學的大佬們或許可以試著寫的人話一點嗎????
評分Even in the appendix, there's no explanation of what Dworkin means exactly when he says "external preference" as opposed to "personal" ones. And at one point, he uses a phrase "good or bad external preferences". It proves my speculation: he assumes "good" before "preference". But U-theory could do the other way around. What is his reply?
評分閻王爺的告示——鬼話連篇。
Taking Rights Seriously 2025 pdf epub mobi 電子書 下載